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Abstract—Demand-side management presents significant ben-
efits in reducing the energy load in smart grids by balancing
consumption demands or including energy generation and/or
storage devices in the user’s side. These techniques coordinate the
energy load so that users minimize their monetary expenditure.
However, these methods require accurate predictions in the
energy consumption profiles, which make them inflexible to real
demand variations. In this paper we propose a realistic model
that accounts for uncertainty in these variations and calculates
a robust price for all users in the smart grid. We analyze the
existence of solutions for this novel scenario, propose convergent
distributed algorithms to find them, and perform simulations
considering energy expenditure. We show that this model can
effectively reduce the monetary expenses for all users in a real-
time market, while at the same time it provides a reliable
production cost estimate to the energy supplier.
Index Terms—Load management, robust analysis, non-convex
optimization, distributed algorithms, game theory
I. INTRODUCTION
SMART grids represent the concept behind the intendedevolution of the electric grid, which through information
acquisition from the end users will allow for more efficient
energy distribution, flexibility in network topology, adaptive
load management and better integration of renewable energy
plants with the consumption requirements of the users.
One important concept to achieve the smart grid’s objec-
tives is the demand-side management, which includes the
techniques for better energy efficiency programs, distributed
energy generation, energy storage and load management. The
model presented in this work establishes a robust energy price
one day ahead, which takes into account the production costs
of energy as well as uncertainties in the expected energy
loads. We also consider a real-time market, where users are
charged their specific demanded energy at the robust price,
permitting some deviation without any extra penalty. This
model provides some flexibility to every user in their real-
time consumption energy loads and calculates the energy
prices in a conservative manner, taking into account production
costs and possible errors. In particular, we focus on a robust
analysis of the demand-side management algorithms, where
the energy strategies account for worst-case error deviations
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in the predicted loads. In our formulation, these error terms
vary from user to user and depend on the energy load profiles.
We show that this model can effectively reduce the monetary
expenses of all users in the real-time market, while at the same
time it can provide a confident production cost estimate to
the energy supplier. Our analysis also shows that the added
computational cost of these error calculations is minimal and
the monetary gain is significant. Moreover, the calculations are
amenable to a distributed implementation within the commu-
nications network of the smart grid. This is important because
distributed algorithms are beneficial in terms of communica-
tion efficiency and computation scalability [1].
To further support our results we perform simulations in
a real-time modeled scenario. We also compare our robust
proposal with a naive version where users do not take into
account price deviations, but where the energy supplier still
establishes a robust price. Finally, we also present results
illustrating the convergence behavior of our algorithm.
This study can be of special interest to energy supply
authorities who can analyze how much energy they should
account for if they plan for grid load estimation errors and
peak demand costs. Even though users may be only interested
in their monetary expenditure as energy consumers, supply au-
thorities have to account for local deviations in the distribution
network and coordinate with all agents to provide unobstructed
service by controlling regular and peak supply stations. The
fact that an agent in the network can alter the expected energy
load by injecting or subtracting energy unexpectedly is a
source of extra costs that have to be taken into account by
suppliers that monitor the grid’s energy demand. Therefore,
these energy provision costs justify a modified pricing model
and a worst-case analysis of the demand-side network.
A. Related Work
The work presented here is focused on the study of the
demand-side management framework through noncooperative
game theory. We build our results from [2], where the authors
consider a day-ahead scheduling algorithm and the users
optimize energy generation and storage profiles in a distributed
manner. Our model extends [2] by adding error terms to
the expected consumption profiles (energy loads in the smart
grid) and admitting variations in the estimated values with a
bounded error. In addition, we analyze the effect that these
error terms produce in the expected energy demand. In order
to do so, we extrapolate some techniques from reference [3],
where a robust algorithm for communications is developed.
Regarding a real-time energy market, several models have
been proposed in the literature. For instance, the authors
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from reference [4] propose a real-time cost function with
penalization terms in which the users minimize the expected
monetary expenses. The energy production model assumes that
the cost of energy is given by a quadratic function of the total
demand, and therefore, the whole energy price of the smart
grid is affected by the real-time variations. In such setting,
the energy price is predetermined one day ahead, but it does
not account for the unpredictable production costs of real-
time demand. The penalty functions should account for these
extra expenses, but they are also predetermined in advance. If
they are set too costly, they would affect greatly the monetary
expenses of users in the real-time market. On the other hand,
if the penalties are set too low, they would cause an economic
loss to the energy supplier. Our robust model, on the contrary,
sets up an energy price that will allow the energy supplier to
produce energy without incurring unplanned extra costs, and
will allow users flexibility in their energy demand.
Another real-time model is introduced by reference [5],
which proposes an optimization problem in which users de-
mand energy according to a personal utility function. In this
scenario prices are updated according to production costs, but
demand is fully elastic, within some predetermined bounds,
and the problem optimizes a social equilibrium point, rather
than accounting for individual energy requirements. Further-
more, the energy supplier may experience monetary losses
since the pricing mechanism does not cover production costs.
In contrast, our algorithm accommodates individual energy
requirements and ensures that production costs are covered
by the pricing mechanism.
The authors of reference [6] propose a robust scenario
for a real-time market based on linear programming, which
allocates energy load profiles within a time frame. Because
of the uncertainty of prices in real-time, users decide when
to consume energy according to some modeling parameters,
price range estimates and energy requirements. Although the
algorithm is robust in the sense that it assumes a range of real-
time energy prices, the model considers that prices are given
by the energy supplier without taking into account production
costs. Our robust model, on the other hand, establishes the
prices one day ahead considering possible worst-case real-time
variations, and takes into account production costs.
A relevant survey describing some of the last results and
problems of the smart grid infrastructure can be found in [7],
which analyzes different contributions and open problems in
the topic, where demand-side-management is one example of
these. Another publication that models the interaction among
resident users and distributed energy resources is the one
introduced by [8], but it considers prefixed energy generation
and storage load profiles, as opposed to our framework,
which can adapt the profiles depending on the energy prices.
Regarding user behavior, the authors of reference [9] propose a
model that takes into account the subjective behavior of users,
but still does not consider imprecise load predictions.
Therefore, our contribution lies in considering a day-ahead
energy market and minimizing the energy costs of users in
a robust situation where energy demand errors are taken into
account. In Section II we describe the demand-side model,
the day-ahead cost function, the real-time market and briefly
describe the day-ahead optimization process. In Section III we
introduce the robust game and analyze it’s solution through an
equivalent formulation. We also present a distributed algorithm
that solves the game and analyze it’s convergence properties.
Finally, in Section IV we present simulations to illustrate the
validity of our results.
II. SMART GRID MODEL
In this section we introduce the smart grid model, the
types of users in the demand-side of the network, the energy
model, the pricing plan and the error terms. We consider a
general framework with arbitrary convex regions and convex
objectives.
A. Demand-Side Model
The smart grid topology can be divided in three parts,
namely the supply-side, a central unit or regulation authority,
and the demand-side. The supply-side involves the energy
producers, as well as the distribution network. The central unit
coordinates the optimization process. The demand-side entails
the individual end-users as consumers, possibly with means
to generate and/or store energy and/or vary their consumption
profiles. The demand-side may also include users with great
impact on the smart grid, such as industries with high energy
demands or opportunistic agents who participate as local
energy suppliers in the network.
In this paper, the demand-side management focuses on
calculating optimal policies for monetary savings on the con-
sumers’ side, while accounting for worst-case deviations from
the consumption profiles due to unpredictable considerations
in the demand-side. The optimization process involves all
users together with the central unit, who exchange information
for a more efficient use and distribution of energy. This
communication is accomplished with smart meters, which are
the devices in charge of the bidirectional transmission of data
with the central unit and the optimization process.
We assume that all end users indicate their intended amount
of energy consumption one day ahead, so that energy prices
can be calculated based on demand levels during the opti-
mization process. Then, the users can readjust their generation,
storing and consumption profiles according to the variability of
prices. This process is repeated iteratively until convergence.
Algorithms that analyze this process have been studied in [2]
and [10]. However, due to errors in their estimations, the
real consumption may vary from the announced values. If
these variations are uncorrelated among users, sometimes the
energy left unused by some consumers will be spent by others
inducing that, on average, the supply-side will not require to
adjust their generation rates. However, this expected result
may not always be unconditionally true. In addition, there is
interest from the supply-side to provide energy for unexpected
events that may require higher demands. Therefore, we present
analytical results on identifying worst-case energy errors, for
a given confidence interval.
We represent the set of users who participate in this process
with D, and additionally subdivide them into the set of active
usersN and the set of passive users P . Active users have some
means of generating energy on demand (from dispatchable
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sources), possess devices to store energy for future use or
adapt their consumption profiles. On the contrary, passive
users do not adjust their energy consumption profiles and their
consumption is estimated from historical data.
The consumption values are determined one day ahead
among all users, and are subdivided in time-slots h ∈ H =
{1, . . . , |H|}. We define the estimated per-slot energy load
profile ln(h) that indicates the estimated energy usage of user
n ∈ D at time-slot h. We also represent these variables as
row vectors ln = [ln(1), . . . , ln(|H|)] ∈ R|H|, ∀n ∈ D.
Additionally, let l = [l1, . . . , l|D|] ∈ R|H||D| denote the global
vector with the energy loads of all users. Each individual
term ln includes the energy consumption of user n and the
energy contributions or added expenditures that may decrease
or increase the energy load due to the user owning some
device to generate or store energy, respectively. Naturally,
these profiles are variables to the optimization process and will
vary according to the different strategies the user can select.
It is satisfied that ln(h) > 0 if the energy flows from the grid
to the user, and ln(h) < 0 otherwise, when the user is selling
energy to the grid.
We assume that the total load in the network–aggregate per-
slot energy load–at time slot h denoted by L(h) is positive:
0 < L(h) ,
∑
n∈D
ln(h) (1)
and it is calculated by the central unit by aggregating every-
body’s estimated load, including passive and active user’s load.
Finally, we introduce the per-slot energy load error profile
δn(h) as the difference from the estimated per-slot energy
load profile ln(h) and the real value. This difference comes
from the assumption that demand-side users do not know their
consumption requirements with precision and they may deviate
from their estimates. Additionally, active users may also de-
viate from their calculated generation and storing policies for
unpredictable reasons such as malfunctioning, disconnections
or lack of collaboration. For these reasons, introducing an
error term makes the model more realistic. We represent these
error terms both as row vectors δn = [δn(1), ..., δn(H)],
∀n ∈ D as the error profiles of user n and as column vectors
δ(h) = [δ1(h), ..., δ|D|(h)]T , ∀h ∈ H . Note that the index n
or h allows to easily distinguish which one we are referring
to. Additionally, let δ = [δ1, . . . , δ|D|] ∈ R|H||D| denote the
global vector with the error terms of all users.
B. Day-ahead Cost Model
The purpose of our day-ahead model is to establish an
estimate of the energy price that is robust against real-time
energy demand variations. From a practical perspective, it
determines a worst-case energy production cost taking into
account expected user energy loads plus uncertainties, so that
the energy supplier does not suffer monetary losses due to
unplanned real-time demand.
The energy price in the network is determined by the grid
cost function Ch, which is fixed by the supply-authority and
depends on the aggregate per-slot energy load L(h) at each
time-slot. We use a quadratic cost function, which is widely
used in the literature (see e.g. [2], [10]):
Ch(L(h), δ(h)) , Kh
(
L(h) +
∑
n∈D
δn(h)
)2
(2)
where the coefficients {Kh}|H|h=1 > 0 represent the energy
cost at each time slot determined by the supply-side. In
addition, the individual cost for user n ∈ D at time slot h
is its proportional part of the total cost, i.e., Ch(L(h), δ(h)) ·(
(ln(h) + δn(h))/(L(h) +
∑
n∈D δn(h))
)
, so that its cumu-
lative extension for all time-slots is given by:
fn(l, δ) ,
∑
h∈H
Kh
(
L(h)+1T δ(h)
)
(ln(h)+δn(h))+M(δn)
(3)
where ln is a convex function; ln ∈ Ωln ; all regions Ωln
are convex, compact and independent among users; and 1 is
a column vector of appropriate size. Additionally, we have
included a penalization term M(δn) that includes management
or distribution costs, which accounts for the extra expenses
that the supply authority has to account for during the pricing
process. We separate these penalization terms from the energy
prices due to the inherent unpredictable nature of the energy
demand, which is an additional consideration with regards to
the models in references [2], [10].
Since we consider an arbitrary form of ln and Ωln , our ro-
bust proposal can be adapted to different demand-side models.
For instance, in the model from [2], ln has a linear expression
which is a function of the generation and storing capabilities of
its users. Likewise, the model from [10] optimizes an energy
user demand scheduling algorithm where ln is linear and the
feasible region is convex. We can, therefore, adapt a robust
energy price that accounts for real-time uncertainties. And
apart from the models [2] and [10], we can trivially assume a
third one: one in which all users are passive, have no elastic
demand at all, and simply do not optimize their energy load
profiles. In such case, our robust model can still be applied to
determine worst-case estimation errors.
Finally, the error terms we have accounted for in (2)
contribute to the user’s monetary expense fn(l, δ), since
they affect the real-time energy price. In order to deal with
these unknown demand terms, in Section III we propose
a worst-case analysis by solving a coupled min-max game.
This analysis will allow the supply authority to provide for
excess energy demands and establish a robust energy price
that accounts for unplanned demand. In the next subsection
we present how to integrate these worst-case error terms in a
real-time scenario to obtain a robust model.
C. Real-time Pricing Model
Once the robust price has been established one day ahead,
if their demand remains within the worst-case estimation error
limits, users are charged the amount of energy they demand
in real time at the robust price. Outside of these limits, a
penalty function is introduced to cover any extra expenses.
Specifically, our proposed real-time cost model is
f rtn
(
l, δ∗, lrt
)
=
∑
h∈H
KhLˆr(h)
(
lrtn(h)+Ψnh(l, δ
∗, lrt)
)
+M(δn)
(4)
where l is the energy load profile obtained from the day-
ahead optimization process, δ∗ is the worst-case estimation
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error (which is analyzed in Section III), and
Lˆr(h) =
∑
m∈D
lm(h) + δ
∗
m(h) (5)
is the robust total demanded energy plus worst-case estima-
tion errors, calculated in the day-ahead optimization process.
Variable lrt refers to the actual energy load that users demand
in real-time, and Ψh is a penalty function that increases the
cost whenever a user deviates from its specified load profile
range; for example the following function is a real-time cost
model inspired by [4]:
Ψnh(l, δ
∗, lrt) = νh
(
ln(h)− δ∗n(h)− lrtn(h)
)+
+υh
(
lrtn(h)− ln(h)− δ∗n(h)
)+ (6)
where νh and υh are scalar terms and (·)+ = max(·, 0). The
penalty values discourage the return of unused energy during
night or low demand times, and higher use of energy during
day or high demand times.
Note that the penalty function proposed in (6) differs
from [4] in that it does not charge any extra cost within the
uncertainty margins. The reason is that our robust algorithm
already takes into account the extra costs of unplanned demand
from the production model. Note also that a user can still
deviate further than the worst-case error estimates and, in such
case, some penalty function should dissuade the user from
these extremes; nevertheless, these deviations are limited with
some probabilistic confidence.
Thus, our robust model acknowledges the cost of producing
a certain amount of energy plus uncertainties, whereas current
real-time models (like [4]) only establish a surcharge for extra
demand. Robust pricing models are of interest for energy
suppliers as they take into account production costs under real-
time price fluctuations. This is an important remark, because
the real-time demand affects the whole energy price, and not
only the extra demanded energy.
D. Day-ahead Optimization Process
We can now introduce the game Gδ = 〈Ωl,f〉 that mini-
mizes the user’s monetary expense with fixed δ:
Gδ :
{
min
ln
fn(ln, l−n, δ)
s.t. ln ∈ Ωln ,
∀n ∈ D
where l−n = [l1, . . . , ll−1, ll+1, . . . , l|D|] represents the rest of
the other user’s policies, which influence the user’s decision.
We consider the Nash Equilibrium (NE) as the solution
concept of interest for this game, defined as a feasible point
l∗ = [l∗1, · · · , l∗|D|], such that it satisfies
fn(l
∗
n, l
∗
−n, δ) ≤ fn(ln, l∗−n, δ) ∀ln ∈ Ωln (7)
for every player n ∈ D. In our framework, Gδ has at least an
equilibrium point, which can be reached through a convergent
algorithm as established by the following theorem:
Theorem 1. The following holds for the game Gδ with given
and fixed error values δ:
a) It has a nonempty, compact and convex solution set.
b) The individual cost values for the payoff functions of each
player are equal for any NE solution of the game.
c) The game is monotone and NE solutions can be reached
through algorithms of the kind proposed in [11].
Proof: See Appendix A.
Convergent algorithms to reach such NE solutions are
described in [11], which depend specifically on the convex
structure of the game. In particular, they require a single-loop
best response algorithm if the game is strongly monotone, or
a double-loop best-response algorithm if it is just monotone
(with an added proximity term). The specific steps, which are
similar to those described in [2, Alg.1] for their particular
model, but including fixed error terms, are as follows. First,
users determine their respective ln based on a day-ahead
optimization process (considering δ fixed), where every user
knows their energy consumption requirements and energy
costs, and calculate their best strategies depending on the
energy prices. Then, all users communicate their intended
energy load profile ln to the central unit and energy prices
are recalculated. This procedure is repeated iteratively until
all users converge to an NE.
III. WORST-CASE ANALYSIS OF THE ENERGY LOAD
PROFILES
In the formulation of Gδ we implicitly assumed that δ is
given or known a priori, or otherwise is set to zero. However,
these error profiles are in fact unknown random terms that
we added in order to correct any deviation from the real
performance. In this section, these error terms will be treated
as optimization variables, and analyzed from a worst-case
performance perspective. This allows the regulation authority
to jointly consider both the price and management/availability
costs of energy. With this idea in mind, it is realistic to consider
bounded error terms, represented by
∆h , {δ(h) ∈ R|D| | ‖δ(h)‖22 ≤ α(h)} ∀h ∈ H (8)
where α(h) are prefixed in advance and depend on the
time-slot h due to more or less confidence in the regulator
predictions. In practice, these values can be inferred by the
regulation authority, based on historic data from consumers
and expected variations. Quadratic constraints on the error
terms are common in the literature, see e.g. [3], [12].
In order to propose this error model, we have assumed two
conditions that are satisfied generally in practice: i) indepen-
dence of the error terms among users, and ii), no knowledge
of the specific probabilistic error profiles of users. Property
i) is satisfied if we assume that users alter their predicted
energy profiles independently (e.g. a user decides to charge an
electric vehicle for an unexpected event). The energy profiles
of different users can be correlated, but what we assume
to be independent are the deviation errors from these users.
Property ii) implies that if we do not have any knowledge of
the error distribution of a specific user, then it is sensible to
substitute such profile with the error distribution of an average
user profile. By the central limit theorem such average user
profile will approximate a Gaussian distribution. Then, the
error contribution of all users can be modeled as a Gaussian
distribution of zero mean, and variance the sum of all user
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variances. Specifically, equation (8) represents an upper bound
to the overall network error variance.
In the following, we analyze a scenario that considers that
every player has to account individually for their worst-case
error terms and is charged accordingly. The model assumes
that each player is responsible for some maximum error
profiles in joint consideration with the other players.
Before the analysis, we bring up a useful result that guar-
antees global optimality for a maximization problem with
quadratic convex objectives and constraints.
Theorem 2. (from [13, Th.3]). Given the problem
max
x∈Rn
1
2
xTAx+ bTx+ c
s.t.
1
2
xTQx+ dx+ e ≤ 0
(9)
where A 6= 0, Q ∈ Rn×n are positive semidefinite matrices,
b, d ∈ Rn and c, e ∈ R, and Slater’s condition is satisfied:
then x¯ is a global maximizer iff there exists λ¯ ≥ 0 satisfying
Ax¯+ b = λ¯(Qx¯+ d) (10)
−A+ λ¯Q is positive semidefinite. (11)
Note that (10) is a KKT necessary condition, plus a second
requirement (11) that will guarantee global maximum.
A. Worst-Case Min-max Game Formulation
In this section we consider a worst-case situation where
the error terms are coupled among all of the users. We
analyze which are the user’s best response strategies and
how to calculate the worst-case error terms. In particular, this
transforms Gδ into a game where all users have to solve a min-
max cost function, with coupled interactions and constraints.
The new game formulation Gm, where each user n has to
determine variables ln and δn, is given by
Gm :

min
ln
max
δn
fn(ln, l−n, δn, , δ−n)
s.t. δ(h) ∈ ∆h, ∀h ∈ H
ln ∈ Ωln
∀n ∈ D,
where region Ωln is convex, compact and nonempty. The min-
max of game Gm for every user n ∈ D represents a game
with a convex objective function in variables ln and convex
regions. Note that for the specific case that M(δn) is quadratic
and convex in variable δn, then the maximization problem falls
into the category to readily use Theorem 2, since all equations
are quadratic. More generally, we can provide the following
theorem for any continuous function M(δn):
Theorem 3. The following holds for game Gm with min-max
objectives:
a) It has a nonempty, compact and convex solution set.
b) It is monotone in variables ln, and NE can be reached
through algorithms of the kind proposed in [11].
Proof: The max operation inside the objective of each
user in game Gm is performed over a convex and compact set
and, therefore, it is well defined (it always has a solution). The
maximum function in Gm preserves convexity of the objective
in variable ln. Furthermore, if the point that maximizes the
objective is unique, then the objective is differentiable in
ln with gradient ∇lnfn(ln, l−n, δ∗n, δ−n), and where δ∗n =
arg maxδn fn(l, δn, δ−n) denotes the maximal point. This
property is guaranteed by Danskin’s Theorem [14, Sec. B.5].
With this analysis in mind, the required assumptions from [11,
Th.4.1.a] are satisfied and an NE exists. Furthermore, the
Jacobian analysis performed for Theorem 1 (see Appendix A)
remains the same in Gm, with the exception of substituting
the fixed δn with the optimal solution of the max problem
δ∗n. Likewise, we can claim that the game is monotone and,
therefore, that the solution set is also convex [11, Th.4.1.b].
By Danskin’s theorem, if the maximum is not a unique point
then the gradient would become a subdifferential, and slight
variations would have to be considered that include the use of
multifunctions [15].
Game Gm falls into a rather novel category of min-max
problems recently analyzed in [16]. Such reference proposes
an alternative formulation for min-max games, where extra
players are added to solve the maximization parts to decouple
the min-max form. Moreover, reference [16] proves equiv-
alence of NE for both formulations, and proposes solutions
under monotonicity and other requirements. However, our
problem Gm falls into a more general form with individual max
objectives (rather than a common one), where the monotonic-
ity property does not hold. Therefore, the approach from [16]
becomes unsuitable for distributed algorithms. Furthermore,
Gm incorporates global constraints which are not considered
in the previous reference. For this reason, we have to develop
a novel approach for this particular problem.
In order to analyze and solve the coupled maximization
problems for all players, we first formulate an equivalent game
G˜m(λ), which is more tractable, together with a nonlinear
complementarity problem (NCP) indicated by (12). The NCP
is required to establish the equivalence together with other
assumptions on the dual variables λh. We have also particu-
larized the cost term to M(δn) = βm‖δn‖22 with βm ≥ 0,
which is motivated to penalize the user’s local deviations.
Furthermore, this particular choice will allow us to obtain
tractable results for the game and the NCP:
G˜m(λ) :
{
min
ln
max
δn
pn(ln, l−n, δn, δ−n,λ)
s.t. ln ∈ Ωln
∀n ∈ D
0 < Kh + βm ≤ λh ⊥ −
(
‖δ(h)‖22 − α(h)
)
≥ 0, ∀h (12)
where λ = [λ1, . . . , λ|H|]T , a ⊥ b indicates aT b = 0, and
pn(ln, l−n, δn, δ−n,λ) =
∑
h∈H
(βm − λh)δn(h)2
+
∑
h∈H
Kh
(
L(h) +
∑
k∈D
δk(h)
)
(ln(h) + δn(h)). (13)
Next lemma shows the equivalence between Gm and G˜m(λ).
Lemma 1. Games Gm and G˜m(λ) together with the NCP
specified by equation (12) present the same NE solutions.
Proof: The KKT system of equations of Gm and those
of game G˜m(λ) jointly with the NCP are the same, and
therefore, any NE candidate solution can be derived from
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either formulation. A maximum point in both problems exists
since all regions are compact. Inequality λh ≥ Kh + βm
guarantees that such point is maximum because Theorem 2
is satisfied for every user in Gm and, likewise, is maximum
in G˜m(λ) because it makes the objective concave in δn.
Therefore, the NE coincide.
Note that, in this equivalent formulation of G˜m(λ) we
have focused on the special case where all λh are equal
for all players for every h ∈ H . The equilibrium points
of this formulation are normally referred to as “variational”
or “normalized” solutions [17], and the practical implication
is that they establish a common price on a resource for all
agents. These solutions also retain some stability properties
compared to other equilibrium points where the dual variables
are different among users, see [17] for further details.
One benefit from dealing with the new formulation G˜m(λ) is
that the strong max-min property is directly fulfilled if the ob-
jective is convex-concave, as opposed to Gm where it remains
convex-convex (see [18, Ex.3.14b] for further details). This
implies that the min-max can be changed into a max-min and
the solution is not altered, i.e., equivalence of both problems
holds. We see this is true as long as λh ≥ Kh + βm because
the objective is then concave in δn. This allows us to analyze
the monotonicity of the new game setting G˜m(λ) in these
variables. Let us present a lemma that guarantees the existence
of common λh’s satisfying the previous requirements:
Lemma 2. There always exists λh satisfying (12) (i.e., making
G˜m(λ) concave in δn) that is dual optimal in Gm. A lower
bound to this value is: λh > βm +Kh for all h ∈ H .
Proof: See Appendix B.
Now, we can establish the following result.
Theorem 4. The following holds:
a) Game G˜m(λ) has a nonempty and compact solution set.
b) A variational solution of game Gm always exists.
c) If additionally λh > 12Kh(|D|+ 1) + βm, then the game
G˜m(λ) is strongly monotone in variables δn for all n ∈
D, it has a unique NE solution, and it can be reached
by a distributed asynchronous best response algorithm of
the kind proposed by [11, Alg.4.1].
Proof: See Appendix B
In order to solve G˜m(λ) and the NCP described by (12),
we need to study the inner game formed from the coupled
maximization problems in δ. In order to do that, we assume
that l is fixed. Specifically, we analyze the following game:{
max
δn∈R|H|
pn(l, δn, δ−n,λ) ∀n ∈ D (14)
where (14) is solved jointly with the NCP (12). First, note
that all users’ objectives can be separated in |H| independent
problems. This is possible because the objective function pn
is expressed as a sum over h ∈ H and (12) is expressed
separately for every h ∈ H .
Each individual problem has a quadratic form and, hence,
Theorem 2 can be applied to each of them. We can transform
the model given by (12) and (14) into a form resembling (9),
and identify terms A = Kh + βm and Q = 1. We conclude
that (11) is satisfied if λh ≥ Kh + βm. Finally, we obtain the
first order necessary conditions from (14) for all n ∈ D:
Kh
(
ln(h)+L(h)+
∑
k 6=n
δk(h)
)
+2
(
Kh+βm−λh
)
δn(h) = 0,
and form a system of equations together with (12). By sepa-
rating variables and solving, we get
δn(h) =
√
α(h)(ln(h)+L(h)+
∑
k 6=n δk(h))√∑
n(ln(h)+L(h)+
∑
k 6=n δk(h))2
,∀ n ∈ D (15)
λh = Kh + βm +Kh
√∑
n(ln(h)+L(h)+
∑
k 6=n δk(h))2
2
√
α(h)
(16)
where we have chosen positive sign to satisfy λh ≥ Kh+βm.
Since the solution to the fixed point equations is derived
from conditions (10)–(11), they are, therefore, global max-
imum of the individual objective functions. As no player
can further maximize their objectives given the other players
strategies, they form an NE. If the game is strongly monotone
(Th. 4c is satisfied), then asynchronous fixed-point iterations
over these equations will converge to the global maximum.
If the game is not strongly monotone, then the set of op-
timal equations given by (15)–(16) have to be solved in an
alternative fashion. We propose a fixed-point iterative mapping
that results from calculating equation (15) repeatedly, plus a
projection operation. The mapping in vectorial form becomes:
Th(δ(h),ah) = ΠXh
(√
α(h)
ah +Aδ(h)
‖ah +Aδ(h)‖
)
(17)
where ah = L(h)+l(h), A = 11T−I with size |D|×|D| and
ΠXh(·) represents the euclidean projection onto region Xh.
Such region Xh is defined as
Xh ,
{
δ(h) ∈ R|D|+
∣∣ 1T δ(h)+ 1|D|−11Tah−√α(h)|D| ≥ 0}
(18)
where R|D|+ refers to the nonnegative quadrant, so that Xh
corresponds to the upper halfspace region limited by the
hyperplane in the definition.
Next we give the following properties of the mapping Th:
Theorem 5. Given the mapping Th(δ(h),ah) defined in (17)
where ah is fixed, then it follows:
a) Th : Xh → Xh is a self-map for every h ∈ H .
b) Th is a contraction mapping.
c) The update rule δ(h)k+1 = Th(δ(h)k,ah) converges to
a unique point δ(h)∗ ∈ Xh that solves the fixed point
equation:
δ∗(h) = Th(δ∗(h),ah).
d) The point δ∗(h) is an NE of game G˜m(λ), with λ
satisfying (12) and fixed strategies l(h).
Proof: See Appendix C
Because of Theorem 5 and the equivalence principle of
Lemma 1, the fixed-point solution of the mapping also maxi-
mizes the objectives of game Gm. Thus, the mapping provides
an iterative method to find a solution of the game, regardless
of its monotonicity properties.
Region Xh in (18) becomes a technical adjustment that
allows the operator to be a contraction self-mapping. It has an
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involved interpretation, but in simple terms it limits the search
space of the fixed-point to the upper region of the hyperplane.
In particular, in such upper halfspace the mapping is always a
contraction, while in the lower halfspace such property is not
always satisfied. Therefore, a fixed point in Xh always exists,
and a recursive algorithm will converge to such point.
Finally, we can explicitly give an expression of the projec-
tion operation into the halfspace Xh, which is given by
ΠXh(x) ,

x if x ∈ Xh
x+
(√
α(h)− (A−1ah + x)T 1‖1‖) 1‖1‖
if x /∈ Xh,
which only involves linear operations.
B. Distributed Robust Algorithm
Distributed implementations are beneficial for the smart
grid because of their computation scalability. Therefore, we
propose the distributed Algorithm 1.
The algorithm solves Gm, and because of the monotonicity
shown in Theorem 3 in variable l, convergence is guaranteed.
The proximal term included in step (S.3) is necessary if Gm is
only monotone, and τ needs to be sufficiently large and satisfy
that the game becomes strongly monotone, as indicated in [11,
Cor.4.1]. Any optimization toolbox would suffice to solve the
strongly convex problem indicated in (S.3), which has a unique
solution. In step (S.4.), we solve the inner max game G˜m(λ)
among all players with fixed components li+1n . In order to do
so, we iteratively calculate T (δ(h)k,ah) until convergence,
which is guaranteed by Theorem 5. The main outer loop is
also repeated until convergence.
Regarding the information exchange costs, users solve their
local optimization problems, and then communicate their in-
tended energy load profiles to the central unit. The central unit
aggregates all energy loads and computes the individual worst-
case error terms and the robust energy price defined in (5).
Then, the robust energy price and the individual worst-case
error estimates are communicated back to the users (privacy of
individual values is preserved). Finally, the users re-optimize
their new energy load profiles.
It seems sensible that the inner loop described on step 4 of
Algorithm 1 is performed by the central unit. It involves simple
operations described by the mapping Th(δ(h),ah), which
scales linearly with the number of users |D|, and requires
no communication in order to find a solution. An alternative
computation of the error terms in a distributed fashion is also
possible, but it would increase the required communication.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present simulation results from our robust
analysis. First, in Subsection IV-A we present a real-time
cost comparison with a non-robust model to illustrate that
the robust model can effectively reduce the monetary costs.
Secondly, in Subsection IV-B, we compare our algorithm with
a model formed by naive users who do not take into account
the worst-case error terms. We show that the monetary loses
in this case are not negligible, and emphasize the importance
of optimizing the energy loads taking into account the error
terms. In addition, we include convergence results.
Algorithm 1 Distributed robust algorithm for game Gm
(S.1) Given Kh for all h ∈ H . Set iteration index i = 0.
Set τ > 0. Initialize δ0(h) =
√
α(h)√
|D| 1.
(S.2) If a termination criterion is satisfied, STOP.
(S.3) Solve for every n ∈ N
li+1n = arg min
ln∈Ωln
f(ln, l
i
−n, δ
i) +
τ
2
(ln − l¯in)2
(S.4) Iterate from k = 0 until convergence
δˆk+1(h) = T (δˆk(h),ai+1h ), ∀h ∈ H (19)
where ai+1h =
∑
n∈D l
i+1
n (h) + l
i+1(h).
Set the fixed-point solution: δi+1 ← δˆk+1.
(S.5) If an NE has been reached, update centroids l¯in = l
i
n.
(S.6) Set i← i+ 1. Go to (S.2).
In the following simulations, we used Algorithm 1 to
determine δn and ln applied to a scenario similar to the
one proposed in [2]. In this kind of scenario, users decide
upon local energy generation and storage strategies. The total
number of users |D| will vary between simulations, but the
proportion of active users remains fixed in all of them, where
|N | = b|D|/2c. From the active users set N , the number of
users that generate and store energy is GS = |N |−2b|N |/3c,
the number of users who only generate is G = b|N |/3c and
the number of users who only store energy is S = b|N |/3c.
The day is divided in |H| = 24 time slots. The average
consumption per user is of 4.5 kWh with cost coefficients
Kday = 1.5Knight, where we assumed there is lower price
at times hnight = [1, ..., |H|/3] and higher price at time slots
hday = [|H|/3 + 1, ..., |H|]. These values are determined so
that the initial average price for the day without any demand-
side management is of 0.1412 £/kWh (same as in [2]).
Other parameters involving active users with generation
capabilities, GS and G, are: g(max)n = 0.4 kWh/h, which
is the maximum energy production capability per hour by the
user’s owned infrastructure; and γ(max)n = 0.8g
(max)
n , which is
the maximum energy production capability per day. For active
users owning storing devices, GS and S, we define the follow-
ing variables: the hourly batteries leakage rate αn =
24
√
0.9,
the charge efficiency υ+n = 0.9, the efficiency at discharge
υ−n = 1.1, the capacity of the storage device cn = 4 kWh,
the maximum charge rate per hour s(max)n = 0.125cn, the
charge level at the beginning of the day qn(0) = 0.25cn and
the difference of charge at the next day n = 0. All these
variables are further explained in reference [2]. In essence,
the parameters presented form a convex model of the problem
that can be solved using convex optimization solvers.
The energy demand profiles per user have been simulated
using a typical day profile similar to the one used in [2] plus
some random Gaussian noise that adds some variance to the
users. The α(h) terms have been fixed to be the 10% of the
total energy demand per time slot h ∈ H .
A. Real-time Cost Comparison
In this subsection, we present a comparison of our robust
model with the non-robust model from [4], when users de-
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Fig. 1: Real time averaged cost functions over 100 simulations
comparing robust function (4) and (20). The left axis shows
the monetary cost of all users and the right axis shows (in %)
the mean relative gain when using the robust algorithm.
viate from their day-ahead optimized energy load profiles.
Specifically, we present the average cost function over 100
independent simulations, where the real time error deviations
are given by white Gaussian processes with zero mean and
variance α(h)/|D| for each user, and where the number of
users |D| ranges from 100 to 2000. The cost function we use
to evaluate the performance in real-time of Algorithm 1 is
described in (4). Likewise, the cost function for user n we
compare with, denoted as ‘non-robust’, has the following form:
f nrtn
(
l, δ∗, lrt
)
=
∑
h∈H
KhLˆwc(h)
(
lrtn(h) + νh
(
ln(h)− lrtn(h)
)+
+υh
(
lrtn(h)− ln(h)
)+)
, (20)
which has no error terms in contrast to (4). Note also that we
are representing the average cost of all users in the network. Fi-
nally, values νh and υh are set to νh = 0.2κ for h ∈ [0, . . . , 8],
νh = 0.8κ for h ∈ [9, . . . , 24] and υh = (κ − νh), where
κ =
√|D|/α(h). The specific simulation parameters νh and
υh are obtained from [4], and parameter κ is introduced to
incorporate the uncertainty of the real-time consumption in
the penalty terms. Note that the value of κ is the inverse of
the deviation of every user’s real-time error distribution.
The average results of the cost models are presented in
Figure 1. The term M(δn) is not present in (20), so we set
M(δn) = 0 in (4) for a fair comparison. Commenting on these
results, we observe that the cost for the users is significantly
lower than with a penalty based model as (20). Therefore, this
model effectively reduces the monetary expenses of all users
in the real-time market, while at the same time provides a
reliable production cost estimate to the energy supplier.
B. Comparison of Algorithm 1 with naive users
In order to further support our results, we include the
performance of our robust algorithm and compare it to a
scenario where users do not consider the worst-case error
terms in their energy load profiles. In Figure 2, we plot the
monetary cost of all users in different sizes of the smart grid.
The number of users in this plot varies from 100 to 2000 users,
and the total number of time slots is |H| = 24. The curve we
refer to as “naive users” is the solution to the game without
accounting for any error terms (i.e., δ = 0), but with added
worst-case calculations in the price determined by the energy
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Fig. 2: Energy cost of all players vs. number of users. The
left axis shows the monetary cost and the right axis shows the
mean relative gain (in %) when using the robust algorithm.
supplier. On the other hand, the robust curve represents the
total energy cost when using Algorithm 1, which does take
into account the worst-case error terms. The average relative
gain over all users when using the robust algorithm is around
the 7%, which remains almost constant with the number of
users; these savings values are represented in the right hand
axis of the figure for different number of users. This result
illustrates that users should adjust their energy load profiles
after taking the worst-case error terms into account. For these
simulations we fixed the term βm = 0.001.
In Figure 3a, we plot the convergence rate of Algorithm 1,
which depicts the averaged convergence rate particularized for
1000 users. The convergence rate is very similar to the results
presented in earlier approaches (see, e.g., as [2, Alg.1]). Our
algorithm has the same algorithmic steps except for the inner
loop involved in step 4, which we didn’t observe to impact the
computation time. In Figure 3b, we plot the convergence speed
of the contraction mapping from step (S.4) in Algorithm 1. The
x-axis shows the number of iterations and the y-axis shows the
magnitude
∑
h∈H ‖δk+1(h) − δk(h)‖. The stopping criteria
was set to 10−8. Recall that convergence is guaranteed since
the computation in (S.4) is a contraction mapping.
The proposed algorithm was implemented in Matlab
R2015a using an Intel i5-2500 CPU @ 3.30GHz. The user’s
optimization problems were run in sequential order (although
in practice they can run in parallel). The local convex optimiza-
tion problems have unique optimal points, so any optimization
solver will produce similar results as ours. In particular, we
used the fmincon function from Matlab. The whole simulation
took about 61.38 seconds for 1000 users.
As a conclusion, these simulations show consistent results
in which there is an actual benefit of around the 7% when
using a robust algorithm vs. a naive one (i.e., that does not
take into account the error terms for the optimization process),
while the extra computation required is minimal.
V. CONCLUSION
We presented a demand-side management model that takes
into account deviations in the estimated consumption profiles,
and analyzed the worst-case effects of these terms. We con-
sidered a scenario where the error terms are calculated by
the energy users (yielding a min-max game) which includes
non-concave maximizing problems for all users. This method
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(a) Convergence rate of Algorithm 1 with convergence criteria ‖li−
li−1‖2/‖li‖ ≤ 10−2.
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(b) Convergence rate of δk(h) from step 4 in Algorithm 1 with
convergence criteria
∑
h∈H ‖δk+1(h)− δk(h)‖ ≤ 10−8.
Fig. 3: Convergence rates for 1000 users.
provides estimates of the worst-case energy deviations and
aggregate loads of the network, and further considers robust
pricing as an effect of both global energy demand, as well as
uncertain real-time demand costs of the supply authority. The
problems can be solved globally due to the quadratic structure
they present in the objective and constraints. With a novel
analysis we are able to prove existence of NE, as well as
to propose a novel convergent distributed algorithm to find
such solutions. The proposed algorithm has very little compu-
tational complexity, and provides significant monetary savings
(around the 7% in our simulations). We further illustrated the
benefit of our robust model giving flexibility to the users within
certain margins while providing a robust production price to
the energy supplier.
APPENDIX A
Proof of Theorem 1: We first need to establish that
function fn(ln, l−n, δ) is convex provided that ln is a convex
function. Indeed, this is satisfied because of the scalar compo-
sition rule [18, Sec.3.2.4], where fn(ln, l−n, δ) is monotone
if L > 0, as required by (1). Then, because Ωln is convex by
assumption, the individual user problem is also convex.
The rest of the results we establish are similar to the
ones considered in [2, Th.1 & Th.2]. These are based on
the equivalence of game Gδ to a variational inequality, as
explained in [11]. To show a) is satisfied, it is sufficient to
verify that the regions Ωln are compact and convex, which is
satisfied by definition of Gδ , and that the objective functions
of all players are differentiable and convex in variables ln,
∀n ∈ D. Indeed, the convexity is guaranteed since the
objective functions are quadratic with positive terms in the
squared elements so that the Hessian results into a diagonal
matrix of the form diag({Kh}h) that is positive definite.
Hence, the claim is satisfied applying [11, Th.4.1].
The justification of b) is readily available by observing that
the objective is convex in ln(h) and that other players actions
only affect the individual objective through the aggregate
L(h). Therefore, the maximum value is unique for each player
given any strategy profile l∗−n since the maximum does not
depend on individual decisions. This shows that even if there
are multiple NEs that reach the maximum of fn(ln, l−n), the
objective value of the user remains constant.
The game is monotone if the Jacobian JFGδ (l, δ) is positive
semidefinite , where JFGδ (l, δ) =
(∇lmFn(l, δ))n,m∈D,
Fn =
(∇lnfn(ln, l−n, δ))n∈D and where fn(ln, l−n, δ)
is described in (3). The Hessian ∇2ln,lnfn(ln, l−n, δ) =
diag({2Kh}h∈H) is positive definite and the other terms
∇2lm,lnfn(ln, l−n, δ) = diag({Kh}h∈H) for m 6= n are also
positive definite and, therefore, so is JFGδ (l, δ). The claim is
satisfied applying [11, Eq.(4.8)].
APPENDIX B
Proof of Lemma 2: We use the extreme value theorem
from calculus (also known as the Bolzano-Weierstrass theo-
rem), which states that a real-valued function on a nonempty
compact space is bounded above, and attains its supremum.
Then, Theorem 2 states that if a maximum exists, there also
exists a λ¯ that satisfies equation (11) and, therefore, we
necessarily have that there exists some λh ≥ Kh + βm that
solves the problem.
Proof of Theorem 4: To proof part a) of the theorem (the
existence of NE in G˜m(λ)) we use a result from [19, Th.1].
We need to show that assumptions A1-A3 and A5 are satisfied
from the mentioned reference (A4 is not required). Indeed,
G˜m(λ) has a number of finite players, the regions for all
players are compact and convex, and all objective functions are
continuous on these regions (which satisfy A1-A3). Condition
A5 is satisfied if we show that pn(l, δn, δ−n,λ) is concave in
δn, which is true if its hessian is negative semidefinite. Indeed,
∇2δn,δnpn = −2diag({λh − Kh − βm}) is diagonal, and is
negative semidefinite if λh ≥ Kh+βm. This also justifies that
the strong max-min property of G˜m(λ) holds and the min-max
can be transformed into a max-min without altering the result.
This concludes the proof of part a) of the theorem.
To prove part b) we need Lemma 1, which guarantees the
equivalence of Gm and G˜m(λ) when (12) is satisfied. Since
by Lemma 2 we have λh ≥ βm +Kh satisfied for all players,
we conclude that a variational solution (a solution in which all
λh are shared among all users) exists. Note that the game Gm
cannot satisfy condition A5 from previous paragraph directly
and, therefore, the reformulation as G˜m(λ) is convenient to
conclude the existence of an NE.
In order to prove part c), it suffices to show that the
Jacobian JFG˜m(λ)(δ(h)) of the variational inequality asso-
ciated with the game is negative definite [11, (4.8)]. This
is defined as JFG˜m(λ)(l, δ) =
(∇mFn(l, δ))n,m∈D, where
Fn =
(∇δnpn(l, δn, δ−n,λ))n∈D and pn(l, δn, δ−n,λ) is
described in (13). The Hessian for each h ∈ H is diagonal
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on all players, and the Jacobian on each h ∈ H becomes
∇2δ(h),δ(h)pn(l, δ,λ) = (Kh + 2βm − 2λh)I+Kh11T (21)
where I is the identity matrix of size |D| × |D|, and 1 is
column vector of ones of length |D|. The Hessian matrix be-
comes diagonally dominant with negative diagonal entries for
λh >
1
2Kh(|D+ 1|) + βm and, thereby, negative definite [20,
Cor.7.2.3]. If such condition is satisfied, then the game is
strongly monotone and it has a unique NE that can be reached
by a suitable algorithm [11].
APPENDIX C
For notation simplicity, we refer in this section Th(δ(h),ah)
defined in (17) simply as T (x) = ΠX
(√
α Ax+a‖Ax+a‖
)
, where
a = ah is of size |D| × 1, A = 11T − I of size |D| × |D|,
x = δ(h) and where we drop all indexes on h.
Before proving Theorem 5 we first introduce the following
general result:
Lemma 3. Given any two vectors x1, x2 ∈ R|D|, the following
holds: ∥∥∥∥ x1‖x1‖ − x2‖x2‖
∥∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥∥x1γs − x2γs
∥∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥∥x1γ − x2γ
∥∥∥∥
where γs , min{‖x1‖, ‖x2‖} and γ , minx∈X ‖x‖, assum-
ing in the last inequality that γs 6= 0 6= γ.
Proof: We start with the first inequality and assume
without loss of generality that ‖x1‖ ≥ ‖x2‖. Introduce the
shorthands a = x1‖x1‖ − x2‖x2‖ , b = x1‖x2‖ − x1‖x1‖ and, therefore,
a + b = x1‖x2‖ − x2‖x2‖ . By the definition of scalar product,
‖a + b‖2 = ‖a‖2 + ‖b‖2 + 2aT b. Hence, if aT b ≥ 0, we
necessarily have ‖a + b‖ ≥ ‖a‖, since all the sums involve
positive scalars. Then, the inner product results:
aT b =
(
x1
‖x1‖ −
x2
‖x2‖
)T (
x1
‖x2‖ −
x1
‖x1‖
)
(22)
=
‖x1‖
‖x2‖ − 1−
xT2 x1
‖x2‖2 +
xT2 x1
‖x1‖‖x2‖ (23)
=
(‖x1‖
‖x2‖ − 1
)
(1− cos θ) ≥ 0 (24)
where we have used cos θ = x
T
2 x1
‖x1‖‖x2‖ .
The proof of the second inequality is more immediate,
since γsγ ≥ 1 we have ‖a + b‖ ≤
∥∥∥x1γ − x2γ ∥∥∥. A graphical
interpretation of this lemma is presented in Figure 4.
Now we use Lemma 3 to prove Theorem 5.
Proof of Theorem 5: It is clear by the projection operator
ΠXh(·) that T (x) is a self-map onto itself, so a) is immediate.
To prove part b) we need to show that T (x) is a contraction:
‖T (x1)− T (x2)‖ ≤ q ‖x1 − x2‖ (25)
for all x1,x2 ∈ X , and some q ∈ (0, 1). We have∥∥∥√α a+Ax1‖a+Ax1‖ −√α a+Ax2‖a+Ax2(‖∥∥∥ (i)≤ √α ∥∥∥a+Ax1γ − a+Ax2γ ∥∥∥
≤
√
α
γ ‖A‖ ‖x1 − x2‖ =
√
α
γ (|D| − 1) ‖x1 − x2‖
where in step (i) we have applied the result from Lemma 3
and defined γ = minx∈X ‖a+Ax‖.
At this point, we can infer that (25) is satisfied with
q =
√
α
γ (|D| − 1) and hence, T (x) is a contraction mapping
in region X if
√
α
γ (|D|− 1) < 1 is satisfied. In order to prove
this last condition, we analyze the quadratic form ‖Ax+a‖ >√
α(|D| − 1), which is depicted in Figure 5. This inequality
forms a paraboloid with minimum point in x = −A−1a and
curvature specified by it’s Hessian (ATA)1/2. This Hessian
matrix has maximum eigenvalue λmax = (|D| − 1) with
associated eigenvector vmax = 1‖1‖ , and the rest of eigenvalues
are equal with value λmin = 1. The level curve corresponding
to the value of
√
α(|D|−1) is therefore an ellipsoid that grows
faster in the direction of vmax. Then, one sufficient condition
to satisfy that the mapping T is always a contraction, is to
construct the region X outside of the ellipsoid. We define X
as the upper halfspace limited by the hyperplane with normal
vector vmax and most distant point x = A−1a+
√
α 1‖1‖ . Such
region is defined in equation (18) and, since X is convex, the
euclidean projection of T is well defined. This proves b).
The convergence property of the iterative fixed-point equa-
tion directly follows from the Banach fixed point theorem [21,
Th.11.1.6.], which states that the mapping admits a unique
fixed point x∗ = T (x∗) in x ∈ X , and that such point can be
found as the limit point of the sequence xk+1 = T (xk), for
any starting point x0 ∈ X . This proves c).
Finally, to prove d), it is sufficient to show that the following
problem P is feasible:
P :
find x
s.t. x =
√
α a+Ax‖a+Ax‖
1Tx+ 1|D|−1a
T1−
√
α|D| ≥ 0,
which would prove the existence of a point that solves (15)
and is inside region X . An equivalent formulation of P is
find x, z
s.t.
√
α1T (a+Ax) +
(
1
|D|−1a
T1−
√
α|D|)z ≥ 0
‖Ax+ a‖ = z, z > 0.
If 1|D|−1a
T1−√α|D| = 0 the previous problem is uncondi-
tionally feasible. Otherwise, it can be transformed as follows
find y, z
s.t. z ≥ −
√
α
1
|D|−1aT 1−
√
α|D|
1Ty (26)
‖y‖ = z, z > 0. (27)
Equation (26) represents a halfspace defined by a non vertical
and non horizontal hyperplane that passes through the origin.
Equations in (27) represent a positive cone. Since the inter-
section of these spaces is necessarily nonempty the problem is
feasible, and so is P. This proves d) and concludes the proof
of the theorem.
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Fig. 4: Graphical interpretation of Lemma 3
Fig. 5: Graphical interpretation of Theorem 3
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